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ATrORNEY FEES
Bhattachaiya v. Copple, 898 F.2d 766
Per Curiam
Plaintiff Bhattacharya's attorneys appealed an order of the district
court which calculated fees to be paid pursuant to a settlement agree-
ment. The agreement indicated that Bhattacharya's attorneys would re-
ceive $450,000 subject to a district court determination of
reasonableness. After applying Kan. Stat. Ann § 7-121(b), which lists
eight criteria to be used in determining reasonableness of attorney's
fees, the district court awarded Bhattacharya's attorneys $182,640.
Bhattacharya's attorneys argued that the district court should have
awarded the $450,000 in fees as contemplated by the settlement agree-
ment. Defendant, Copple, in an amicus curiae brief, contended that since
the case was settled, the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding. The court
held that an appeal was not prohibited since the settlement agreement
recognized that the district court was required to make an independent
determination. Furthermore, the district court's decision to use an
hourly rate figure to determine fees, despite a fifty-percent contingency
agreement between Bhattacharya and his attorneys, was not an abuse of
discretion. Finally, Copple's request that the attorneys be sanctioned
under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11 was denied. The court reasoned that the
outcome of the appeal was not obvious and, therefore, the appeal was
not frivolous.
Chynoweth v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 648
Author: Judge Baldock
Plaintiff, Chynoweth, appealed a district court order denying her re-
quest to exceed the seventy-five dollar per hour cap on attorney fees
imposed pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. Chynoweth ar-
gued that her attorney's expertise in social security benefits law consti-
tuted a special factor justifying an increase in her rate.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the
increase. The court ruled that the social security benefits law does not
constitute a specialized practice area warranting the special factor excep-
tion to the seventy-five dollar limit. The court explained that the cap
may be exceeded only in the unusual situation where specialized train-
ing, unattainable by a competent attorney, is required.
Cooper v. Utah, 894 F.2d 1169
Author: Judge West, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Cooper, was the class representative in an action challeng-
ing a Utah statute which prohibited the marriage of a person who was
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delinquent in paying child-support. The district court granted summary
judgment for Cooper and determined that attorney's fees should be the
lodestar amount. This amount is based on the number of hours reason-
ably spent on the case multiplied by an appropriate hourly rate. The
district court then decreased this amount by half on the grounds that the
same issues were litigated in Salt Lake City, and an extensive summary
of the arguments supporting Cooper's motion appeared in the Utah Law
Review. Cooper subsequently appealed the district court's reduction of
his attorney's fees.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded the full lodestar amount.
The court based its decision on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This Act authorizes district courts to
award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in civil rights liti-
gation to ensure effective access to the courts. The lodestar amount is
presumptively reasonable. While courts may adjust this amount, neither
the complexity nor the novelty of issues may be considered in making
such an adjustment.
Dahlem v. Board of Educ., 901 F.2d 1508
Author: Judge Anderson, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Dahlem, appealed the district court's order denying his
motion for attorney's fees. In the district court, Dahlem prevailed over
defendant, Board of Education of Denver Public Schools (the "Board"),
and was granted injunctive relief. Dahlem's substantive claims, how-
ever, were rendered moot before obtaining a final judgment on merits
and prior to a possible challenge to the injunction's validity by the
Board.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The
court found that while Dahlem was a "prevailing party" inasmuch as he
won the relief sought, such status did not entitle him to recover attor-
ney's fees. The court explained that the reversal of a companion case
rendered the relief he obtained legally disputable. Moreover, the rever-
sal of the companion case constituted a special circumstance which high-
lighted Dahlem's lack of entitlement to the relief he obtained.
Furthermore, such reversal rendered the award of attorney's fees to
Dahlem unjust because only fortuity prevented Dahlem's judgment from
being reversed at the same time.
Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Ferguson, 896 F.2d 1244
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Federal Land Bank ("FLB"), appealed the district court's
determination that its claim for foreclosure-related attorney's fees was
subordinate to the junior lien of Farmers Home Administration
("FmHA"). On appeal, FLB argued that the district court erred in ap-
plying federal first-in-time and choateness principles rather than appli-
cable state laws in determining lien and fee priority.
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The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court. The
court ruled that FLB's claim for attorney's fees should be given the same
senior priority as its associated mortgage and, therefore, placed ahead
of FmHA's lien. The court reasoned that state law, which provides that
senior lienholder can recover attorney's fees before additional proceeds
are distributed to junior lienholder, governs the lien priority.
Iqbal v. Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n of Am., 900 F.2d 227
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Golf Course Superintendents Association of America
("GCSAA"), appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees in a
race discrimination and retaliatory discharge case. On appeal, GCSAA
argued: (1) plaintiff, Iqbal, only achieved limited or partial success,
whereas GCSAA prevailed on a number of issues, which justified a re-
duced award to Iqbal; and (2) the attorneys' fee award should be limited
by the contingency fee agreement between Iqbal and his attorney. Iqbal
cross-appealed the district court's reduction of his attorney's hourly rate
and thirty-percent reduction of the lodestar.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and re-
manded for calculation of fees and costs to be awarded for the work
done on appeal. First, the court rejected GCSAA's argument that
Iqbal's "limited success" justified a reduced award to Iqbal offset by an
award of fees to GCSAA. The court reasoned that Iqbal was the prevail-
ing party and entitled to attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Sec-
ond, the court affirmed the rejection of the contingency fee agreement
as a cap on attorneys' fees. Last, on cross-appeal, the court found no
abuse of discretion in the district court's approval of an hourly rate
lower than what Iqbal's counsel would normally charge, but higher than
rates it had allowed in previous cases. The higher rate was an "appro-
priate adjustment" for inflation and delay in payment of attorneys' fees.
At the same time, the court held that the district court was within its
discretion in reducing the lodestar to reflect Iqbal's limited success.
Moreover, the court held that Iqbal was entitled to fees and costs for the
appeal. Tenth Circuit precedent is inconsistent on the issue of attor-
neys' fees for an appeal of a fee award, but Iqbal should be awarded fees
because his counsel was forced to defend a statutory fee award and did
so successfully.
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